Mortality Risk and Educational Attainment of Black and White Men by Li Gan & Guan Gong
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
MORTALITY RISK AND EDUCATIONAL 









We would like to thank Peter Debaere, Dan Hamermesh, Preston McAfee, Gerald Oettinger, Max
Stinchcombe, Steve Trejo and Tom Wiseman for helpful discussions.  The views expressed herein
are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2004 by Li Gan and Guan Gong.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Mortality Risk and Educational Attainment of Black and White Men
Li Gan and Guan Gong
NBER Working Paper No. 10381
March 2004
JEL No. J1, J7
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates to what extent the differences in education between black and white men can
be explained by the differences in their mortality risks. A dynamic optimal stopping-point life cycle
model is examined, in which group-level mortality risk plays an important role in determining
individual-level mortality risk, health expenditure, and the amount of schooling. The model is
calibrated to quantify the effect of mortality risks on schooling by taking the black and white male
population as the respective reference groups for black men and white men. We find that the impact
of mortality risk on schooling explains more than two-thirds of the empirical education differences
between black and white males. This conclusion is robust to a set of plausible parameter values.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Black-white wage and income disparity is a persistent social problem in the United 
States. A significant body of work has attributed this disparity to forms of discrimination in 
market places.
2 Anti-discrimination legislation and programs enjoyed early success: Blacks 
reduced the gap with whites during the 1960s and early 1970s. However, the black-white gap 
stagnated from the 1980s through the early 1990s and widened in most of the 1990s. In the 
1990s, a large body of literature tried to understand if the black-white gap is a result of factors 
other than discrimination. Among them, a series of papers found that wage differences between 
blacks and whites can be explained by differences in their pre-market conditions, especially by 
differences in their educational attainment. For example, O’Neill (1990) finds that black-white 
wage differences almost disappear when blacks have the same level of education and Armed 
Forces Qualifications Test (AFQT) scores as whites. Similar results are found in Maxwell (1994) 
and Neal and Johnson (1996); Winship and Korenman (1997) and Neal and Johnson (1996) 
provide convincing evidence that AFQT scores are heavily influenced by years of schooling.  
Although there are many interpretations on the factors behind fewer years of schooling 
for blacks than for whites, in this paper we provide a different explanation through mortality risk. 
Intuitively, education as investment possesses risk. Although the market education return may be 
the same to people, higher mortality risks will lower the individual return of education and, 
therefore, might result in fewer years of schooling. Blacks have higher mortality risks than 
whites, which affords higher risk to reap the wage benefits of schooling. Fewer years of 
schooling could, then, become blacks’ optimal choice. 
A large body of studies finds that health and schooling are highly correlated. For 
example, the life expectancy at birth in England rose from 37.3 years to 48.2 years in the 19th 
century and further increased to 60.8 years by 1930. During the same period, the average years 
of schooling rose from 2.3 years to 9.1 years (see Livi-Bacci 1997 and Matthews, Feinstein and 
Odling-Smee 1982). Neoclassical growth literatures interpret the progress on health through the 
improvement of economic conditions such as gains in per capita income, and hence indirectly 
attribute the gain in health to the improvement of human capital and the relative increase of the 
amount of schooling. The basic idea of those literatures is that education raises income; a higher 
   2income improves nutrition and increase health expenditure, which reduces mortality. 
Nevertheless, other studies show that the strong relation between health and schooling could 
reflect the reverse causality; i.e., schooling could be responding to the anticipated amelioration in 
health. Particularly, some studies argue that health might also be a determinant force behind 
economic development with its large exogenous component that is unrelated to scientific 
knowledge and technological development. For instance, life expectancy
 in China and Sri Lanka 
exceeds 70 years, despite these nations having gross national
 products in 1994 of less than 
$1,000 per capita (Sen 1999). Preston (1980, 1996) relates life expectancy changes to income, 
calorie consumption and disease, and he concludes that approximately 50% of the changes in life 
expectancy were due to “structural factors” unrelated to economic development. Fries (1980) 
states that there is a genetically determined upper limit to life of 85 ± 7 years. Soares (2002) 
shows that recent reductions in mortality rates across countries were largely independent of 
improvements in economic conditions.  
In this paper, we develop a dynamic optimal stopping-point life cycle model, in which 
group-level mortality risk plays an important role in determining individual-level mortality risk, 
health expenditure, and the amount of schooling. We posit that the mortality risks of the 
reference group have a negative externality effect on an individual’s mortality. In our model, the 
mortality risks do not only depend on health expenditure, but also depend on the mortality risks 
of the reference group by which the individual is categorized. Our approach to studying the 
effect of mortality changes on education is related to the work of Ehrlich and Lui (1991), 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000) and Soares (2002), each of which takes mortality as an 
exogenous constant to individuals. In contrast, we advance this model to integrate mortality risks 
into individual’s choices. Although the mortality risks of the reference group for individuals are 
still taken as exogenous in our framework, the individual-level mortality risks and education are 
endogenously determined.  
The ideas of the reference group and its effects on mortality risks are nothing new. While 
genetic traits and lifestyle are usually thought of as the predominant factors to explain health 
status and mortality, there is a growing consensus that the groups (such as the residential 
neighborhoods or local community where people live) play an important part in determining 
people’s health. In a related way, a growing literature on social interactions claims that 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 See a survey by Altonji and Blank (1999). 
   3individual outcome is strongly influenced by reference group due to sociological and/or 
psychological factors (see Manski 1993 and Durlauf 2002). One bridge linking the reference 
group to health is the role model effect or peer group influence, in which an individual may 
desire to conform to the behaviors of older or contemporaneous members of his group and intend 
to mimic their behaviors. Among these behaviors, some are related to health, such as smoking, 
dietary habits and physical activity, and therefore have detrimental effects on health. Another 
linkage between reference group and health is the psychosocial stress caused by diseases or 
crimes, which may have adverse biological consequences on the individual’s health. Empirical 
studies finding the relationship between the characteristics of the reference group and the 
individual’s health outcomes are plentiful. Roux et al. (2001) find that living in a disadvantaged 
neighborhood
 will increase the incidence of coronary heart
 disease even after controlling for 
personal income, education
 and occupation. After investigating the influence of individual 
neighborhood socioeconomic status on mortality, Winkleby and Cubbin (2003) show that a 
person who lives in a poor neighborhood has 20% higher death rate than a person who lives in a 
rich neighborhood after controlling individual characteristics.  
We apply the model to study the impact of differential mortality risks on the educational 
attainment of black and white men.
3 In particular, we consider an agent at the age of 16, having 
finished compulsory education, deciding (with his parents) how many additional years of 
schooling to obtain. The agent faces the probability of death in every period and maximizes the 
discounted value of the expected utility from consumption and leisure. We assume that a black 
man has the same utility, the same discount rate, the same return to education and the same 
living and working conditions as a white man. The only difference between a black man and a 
white man is the mortality risk of their reference groups. In this model, both the years of 
schooling and the life expectancy at the individual level are endogenously determined. The 
exogenous variable is the reference group’s mortality risk.  
It is important to point out that we do not claim here that factors such as labor market 
discrimination, differential opportunities in access to higher education, parental preferences and 
occupational preferences do not affect the life prospects of black and white men. What this paper 
                                                 
3 We focus our attention only on men. Studying the effect of mortality on education is considerably more difficult 
for women than for men since women are more likely to face additional choices in leaving the labor force 
temporarily to have and raise children. Therefore, any meaningful analysis of the effect of mortality risk on 
education, fertility and labor force participation for black and white women requires separate treatment. 
   4shows is that the mortality differences can explain the difference in schooling years when all 
other factors are the same for both black men and white men. 
The model is calibrated to quantify the strength of the effect of mortality risks on 
schooling. We let the black male population be the reference group for a black man while the 
white male population is the reference group for a white man. Under a set of reasonable 
parameter values, our baseline results show that the impact of mortality risk on schooling 
explains more than two-thirds of the empirical education differences between black and white 
males. This remains true with a series of sensitivity analyses. Each time we change one of the 
values of parameters while holding other parameters at their baseline values. We find that 
although the levels of educational attainment for both blacks and whites deviate from the 
observed years of schooling, the difference in years of schooling between black men and white 
men does not vary much. Since the only difference between blacks and whites is their reference 
groups’ mortality risks, we claim that the observed difference in mortality risks between black 
men and white men can explain most of their differences in education.   
Understanding why blacks have less education than whites has important policy 
implications. If education is the key reason for future wage differences, public policies designed 
to reduce the black-white wage gap should concentrate on helping blacks attain more education.  
If the higher mortality risk of blacks is a major cause of less education, then public policies 
should put more emphasis on improving access to health care and intervening in the composition 
of residential neighborhoods, such as making predominantly black neighborhoods safer (since 
part of the risk may result from living in high-crime neighborhoods).  
  The rest of paper proceeds as follows. Section II introduces a mortality production 
function and develops a dynamic optimal stopping-point model. In section III we calibrate the 
model and explore whether the difference of mortality risks between black males and white 
males is capable of generating the observed educational difference. A brief conclusion is given in 
Section IV. 
 
II.  The Model 
In this section, we develop a dynamic optimal stopping-point model to analyze the effects 
of mortality risks on years of schooling. We start with the mortality risk production function 
since it explicitly illustrates the channel from mortality to schooling.  
   5We assume that an individual’s production function of mortality risk is:   
( ) ( ) ( ),       ( 1 )    
t d e t m t m
β µ
− = ˆ
where m is the hazard rate of the individual, m  is the hazard rate of the reference group and d is 
the health expenditure. The term “health expenditure” includes all expenditures that may affect 
an agent’s mortality, such as time and money spent on health clubs, appropriate nutrition, 
medical insurance and other expenses related to health care. Spending on smoking can also be 
included as a negative expenditure. Health expenditure as an input into the production function 
of mortality has been broadly used in the literature of health economics since Grossman (1972a, 
1972b). Individual-specific health characteristics, such as genetic traits and illness, are captured 
by a positive parameter µ.  The exponential specification in (1) implies that health expenditure 
has a decreasing marginal effect on health, with β being the percentage gain in mortality 
reduction from one unit of health expenditure.  
ˆ
The negative externality of the reference group’s mortality on individual health, as 
argued in Section I, has been substantiated in growing studies. Although the mortality risk of the 
reference group is taken as exogenous to the individual in the model, the current model does not 
offer any guidance as to how the reference group is selected. For example, a black male may 
choose the general black male population as his reference group. Alternatively, he may view a 
smaller group of people whom he is familiar with, such as his family and his friends, as his 
reference group. It is also possible for a black male living in a suburban white neighborhood to 
view the white male population as his reference group. In other words, identifying the reference 
group may be subjective.  
It is worth noting that (1) assumes that an agent’s mortality is only affected by his 
reference group’s mortality and his health expenditure. The agent’s education affects his 
mortality only by health related expenditure. However, previous literature shows that a better-
educated agent can be more effective in using the money he spends on reducing mortality 
(productive efficiency). In addition, since a better educated agent may have more knowledge on 
the adverse effects of some activities (smoking, bad diet, etc.) and the positive effects of other 
activities (exercise, appropriate diet, etc.), he is more likely to allocate resources to improve his 
   6health (allocative efficiency).
4 Modeling these two efficiencies in the current framework is 
beyond the scope of the paper. 
With the mortality risk production function in (1), the survival rate for the individual is 
given by:    
() () [] { } dt t d t m t p
t
∫ − − =
0 exp ˆ exp ) ( β µ .     (2) 
Equation (2) implies that the level of survival rate for an individual is a positive function 
of his current and past health expenditure.  
Now we turn to the dynamic optimal stopping-point model. We consider an individual 
who is 16 years old. After finishing his compulsory years of schooling, he (with his parents) 
chooses how many additional years of schooling he will undertake. Let the instantaneous utility 
at time t be  , where c  is consumption and  () () ( t l t c u , ) () t ( ) t l  is leisure (the labor supply is 1-  ( ) t l ). 
The function   is assumed to be strictly concave, increasing in each argument, twice 
continuously differentiable. The lifetime utility maximization problem is, in the formulation of 
Yaari (1965): 
) , ( ⋅ ⋅ u
() ()() () () () () () () ( ) ( ) () ( ) ∫ ∫ ∫






t l t c t d S dt e t p t c u dt e t p t l t c u dt e t p l t c u
θ θ θ 1 , , , max
0 , , ,
          (3) 
where choice variable S is the amount of additional schooling after 9 years of compulsory 
schooling; θ is the time discount rate; T is the time of retirement and N is the maximum 
longevity. In this model, we let the retirement age and maximum longevity be exogenous. We 
assume that the individual retires at age 65, thus T= 49 (i.e. age 65 minus the initial age 16). And 
we let the maximum age to which the individual could survive be 110, thus N=94 (i.e. age 110 
minus the initial age 16). The only uncertainty that the agent faces at any future date comes from 
the possibility of death.  
The lifetime utility in (3) consists of three parts, representing three stages of the 
individual’s life cycle. The first part in (3) is the expected utility from schooling. At the 
schooling stage, we assume that schooling is structured such that leisure from schooling in each 
period is a constant,  () l t = l  for t<S. The individual chooses additional years of schooling, S, and 
a consumption profile at this stage. The life cycle model in (3) assumes irreversibility: if an 
                                                 
4 For a survey on productive efficiency, see Grossman (2000); the survey on allocative efficiency can be found in 
Kenkel (2000). 
  
   7individual has started to work, he cannot come back to school again at later time in his life cycle. 
The second part in (3) is the expected utility from working. At this stage, the individual chooses 
a profile of consumption and leisure. At time T, the agent retires from work. The third part in (3) 
describes the expected utility from retirement. At this stage, the agent only chooses a 
consumption profile. His leisure after retirement is 1.  
Corresponding to the life cycle utility function in (3), the agent’s wealth (or asset) 
accumulation equation is divided into three parts:   
                                
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() ()
() () () () ( ) () ()
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() () () ()
() ( ) () . given 0 , 0 0
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t d t wh l t c t rA t A S t
= =
− − = ∈
=
− − − + = ∈
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    (4) 
where A(t) is wealth at time t, h(t) is the human capital at time t and w is wage rate per unit of 
human capital. The market interest rate r is assumed to be constant. At the first stage, the 
individual accumulates human capital with the rate g(t) at each t. Function g(·) is increasing and 
concave in the amount of schooling. Following Bils and Klenow (2000), we assume that the cost 
of education (including tuition, room and board) increases with the level of education. The 
parameter ξ(>0) is the ratio of schooling cost to the opportunity cost of student time. At the 
second stage, the agent goes to work and earns the labor income: per unit of labor wage (wh(t)) 
multiplied by his labor supply (1-l(t)). For convenience, we assume that there is no accumulation 
and depreciation of human capital at this stage. At the third stage, the agent retires and consumes 
the wealth he accumulated when he worked. The initial and end wealth are assumed to be zero, 
and the initial human capital is given.  
The first-order conditions yield the differential equations for consumption:
5   
) , 0 [ S t∈ :   ()
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() ()
() () () () ( t m r
l t c u t c
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5 For solving dynamical optimization problem with switches in the state equations, see Kamien and Schwartz 
(1991). 
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Equations (5a)-(5c) are the ordinary Euler equations respectively corresponding to 
different stages. These three equations describe necessary conditions that have to be satisfied on 
any optimal path. At any  , the optimal consumption and leisure make the marginal rate 
of substitution equal to the marginal rate of transformation: 
) , [ T S t∈
    ( ) ( ) ()
() () () () t wh
t l t c u





.        ( 6 )  
At the time S and T, there are jumps in consumption and leisure. The consumption and 
leisure at these two points satisfy the conditions:      
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
+ + − = S l S c u l S c u c c , , ,  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 , ,
+ − − = T c u T l T c c c u ,   (7) 
where   is defined as t < S and t  while   is defined as t > S and t . The variables 
− S S →
+ S S →
− T  and 
+ T are analogues to  and  . Equation (7) says that the optimal consumption and 
leisure will make the marginal utility of consumption be the same at the time when the agent 




The optimal health expenditure satisfies 
()() ( )() () ()() () t p t l t c u dv e v m v p v l v c u c
N
t
t v , ,
) ( ∫ =
− −θ β ( ) .    (8) 
where the left-hand side (divided by the right-hand side) is the change (in monetary unit) of the 
present value of utility from increases in current and future survival rates caused by health 
expenditure. Therefore, equation (8) implies that the necessary condition for optimal health 
expenditure equates the marginal gain from an extra unit of health expenditure to its marginal 
cost, which is 1. 
Finally, the necessary condition for the optimal amount of schooling is, 
() () () () ()
() () () ()() ()
() () () () ( ) ()  

 
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   9Equation (9) implies that marginal gains equal to marginal costs from an extra year of schooling. 
The marginal gains include gain in utility, 
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T
S
dt S t r t l )) ( exp( ) ( 1 )
, and gain in future 
earnings discounted to present, . The marginal costs of 
schooling include consumption
− s g s wh ( ) (
( ) )
+ S ( ) (
− −c S c , tuition ( ) ( ) S wh l − 1 ξ , opportunity cost from 
forgoing working ( ) ( ) () S wh S l
+ − 1 by staying in school. The gap between the utility from 
attending schooling and that from going to work enters because of the jumps of consumption and 
leisure at the time of the switch in stages. The same reason applies to the gap of consumptions in 
equation (9).    
The individual optimal amount of schooling and hazard rate are not explicit functions of 
the model’s parameters and the mortality risks of the reference group. In the next section, we 
apply the model to the calibration method and explore to what extent the difference in 
educational attainment between black and white males can be attributed to the difference in their 
mortality risks. It is important to recognize that when studying the differential mortality risks 
between black and white men, it is necessary that the model can work with age-varying mortality 
risks since black and white men have different mortality risk patterns over their life cycles. 
 
III.   Mortality Risk and Educational Attainment of Black and White Men 
In this section, we apply our earlier model to study the main objective of the paper: to 
what extent the differences in education between black men and white men can be explained by 
their difference in mortality risks.  
It is well-known that mortality risks are different for black and white men. In the 1979-
1981 U.S. decennial life tables, the life expectancy (conditional on surviving to age 16) is 66.2 
years for a black male and 72.1 years for a white male. Relative average mortality risks vary for 
different age groups. For example, for people ages 21-30, the average yearly mortality risk is 
.311% for black men, which is 75% higher than the mortality risk of white men, or .178%. For 
people ages 31-40, the average yearly mortality risk for black men is .440%, which is 159% 
higher than the mortality risk for white men, or .167%.  
   10In our framework, since an agent’s reference group is subjective, it is difficult for 
researchers to determine an agent’s exact reference group.
6 However, in some cases researchers 
should be able to determine what an agent’s reference group is most likely to be. For example, 
given that blacks are very likely to live in neighborhoods with few whites (Massey and Denton, 
1989), researchers should be confident that the reference group of a black male is likely to 
consist of a majority of population of black male; similarly, a white male’s reference group 
should have a preponderance of white males.
7   
We use the U.S. decennial life tables in 1979-1981 to represent the mortality risks that 
people in an age group observe when they make their decisions about years of schooling. The 
years of schooling are based on 1990 census data. The average years of schooling for black men 
ages 26-36 who were in the labor force in 1990 were 12.74 years, while the same group of white 
men averaged 13.50 years. We concentrate on men ages 26-36 in 1990 for two reasons. First, 
people in this age group have already finished their education. Second, since people with less 
education have higher mortality rates, selecting a relatively young group will minimize that 
sample-selection problem.  
The rest of this section includes three parts. In the first part, we set the baseline parameter 
values for the model to calibrate the optimal years of schooling. In the second part, we report the 
results from calibration compared with the observed years of schooling. In the third part, we 
conduct a series of sensitivity analyses by letting parameters deviate from baseline parameter 
values. 
 
A.  Baseline Parameters and Utility Functional Forms  
Applying the model to explore the effect of mortality differences between black men and 
white men on their education difference requires parameterized functional forms for the 
mortality risk, utility and human capital. We first begin by calibrating the production function for 
mortality risk. 
                                                 
6 Some authors argue that groups can be endogenously determined. For example, Fernandez and Rogerson (1997) 
show that individuals endogenously select themselves into different communities or groups according to income.  
7 This paper does not investigate why exogenous difference in mortality between blacks and whites exist. One 
possibility is that rampant discrimination in the labor force before the civil rights movement in 1960s caused a lower 
return to education for blacks than for whites. As a consequence, blacks took less education and spend less in health 
care than in whites, resulting in a higher mortality risk than whites.  
   11In equation (1), the parameter β is the percentage reduction in the average mortality risk 
from one unit of health expenditure. According to Jones (2002), the life expectancy in the U.S. is 
66.6 years in 1960 and 73.9 years in 1997. Thus, the average yearly mortality risk is 
approximately lowered from 1/66.6 in 1960 to 1/73.9 in 1990, a reduction of about 9.88%. In the 
meantime, the U.S. per capita health expenditure rose from $504.6 in 1960 to $2,127 in 1997.  
Therefore, a $10,000 increase in health expenditure will, on average, reduce mortality risk by: 
9.88%*10,000/(2,727 – 504.6) = 0.445. We take the value of parameter β as 0.445, meaning that 
$10,000 health expenditure will reduce mortality risk by 44.5%. Note that the current calculation 
of β assumes that the group mortality  is constant over time. If we let  be a function of 
health expenditure such that 
) ( ˆ t m
) ( >
) ( ˆ t m
, 0 / ) ( ˆ ∂ ∂ t m t d  the value of β is overestimated. In the sensitivity 
analysis in Section IIIC, we discuss how the outcomes of the model vary when β varies. 
To calibrate the value of parameter µ, we rewrite equation (1) as the following log form, 
   ) ( ) ( ˆ ln ln ) ( ln t d t m t m β µ − + = .      ( 1 0 )  
The value of µ can be calculated by taking the mean on the natural log of mortality risks 
across individuals in the reference group. Since   is the group mortality, i.e.,  ) ( ˆ t m [] ), ( ˆ ) ( t m t m E =  
we must have  where c>0 (Jensen’s inequality). Since no guidance is 
offered in the literature on the value of the c, we calibrate the baseline value µ by assuming that c 
= 0. In particular, when c = 0, the ratio ln(µ)/β matches the mean health expenditure in the 
reference group.  The baseline value of µ is calculated using the U.S. health expenditure 
($2,166.5 or 12 percent of GDP) in 1990.
[] c t m t m E − = ) ( ˆ ln ) ( ln
8 In this case µ=1.101. That is to say that if the 
individual’s health expenditure is zero, his mortality risk is around 10% higher than that of his 
reference group. If the constant c>0, the parameter µ is smaller. Therefore, the baseline 
parameter values µ is larger than the real parameter value µ. We discuss how the outcomes of the 
model vary if µ changes in the sensitivity analysis in Section IIIC. 
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8 U.S. health expenditure data are from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary, National Health 
Statistics Group, National health expenditures, 2001. Internet address: www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe. 
 
   12where the relative risk aversion parameter, σ, is set to 2 and the consumption share in utility, α, is 
set to equal 0.33, as in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994).   
Based on the utility function in (11), the first-order conditions (5)-(7) say that for any 
, the consumption is  ) , 0 [ S t∈
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for  t , the leisure l(t) and consumption c(t) are given by equations (14) and (15):  ) , [ T S ∈
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at the switching point from working to retirement, T, the consumption satisfies: 
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The optimal amount of schooling satisfies the equation:  
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Finally, following Bils and Klenow (2000), we let g(t) = η(t+9)
-φ. The term (t+9) reflects 
the fact that the agent has finished 9 years of compulsory schooling. The human-capital 












η 1 ) 9 (
1
exp t t h .       ( 1 9 )  
   13where η=0.32, and φ=0.58, as in Bils and Klenow (2000). In this setup, the marginal return of 
schooling is decreasing. At the given parameter values, the return of an additional year of 
education is about 9% if a person has just finished 9 years of compulsory schooling.  
Other parameters used in the calibration are chosen as the following values: the time 
discount factor is 032 . 0 = θ ; interest rate r is 0.04; the parameter governing the education cost ξ  
is 0.5 as in Bils and Klenow (2000). The wage rate per hour for one unit of human capital is 
$1.47, at which a person with 9 years of compulsory schooling will earn $10 per hour.
9 Since 
there is no guidance in the literature about the value of leisure during schooling, we let  4 . 0 = l , 
i.e., when a person is in school, he uses 60% of his expendable time on studying.  
 
B.  Results 
Given the baseline values for various parameters, we can then obtain the optimal quantity 
of schooling, paths for consumption and mortality, and optimal levels of health expenditures 
based on equations (12)-(18). However, solving this optimization problem with morality risk 
turns out to be numerically challenging. We restrict the analysis to a time independent health 
expenditure, i.e., d(t) = d.  This assumption greatly simplifies the solution.
10  
The results from the baseline parameters are denoted as baseline results. Before we 
present our baseline results, a simple normalization is worth mentioning here. In our analysis, the 
unit of time is one year, denoted as 1. All reported parameter values in our paper (in Tables 1 and 
2 and in Figures 1 and 2) correspond to this. In order to discuss our result in more intuitive dollar 
values, we assume that the total hours that an agent can allocate between leisure and work in a 
year is 5,000, reflecting about 13.7 hours per day.
11 The upper panel of Table 1 lists the baseline 
parameter values and the lower panel reports the baseline results. The baseline results show that 
the optimal years of schooling is 12.6 years for black men and 13.12 years for white men. 
Compared to the observed 12.74 years of schooling for black men and 13.50 years for white 
men, the predicted schooling years are a little lower and the predicted gap in schooling is 68.4% 
                                                 
9 Based on Census 1990, the average hourly rate for men with only nine years of schooling is $9.95.  
10 When the health expenditure d is constant across ages, the necessary for the optimal health expenditure is given 
by: 
()() ( )() () () ( )( ) 






N v e l c u dv e v p v p v l v c u r
θ β
11 If one assumes that the total hours per year are 4,000, then all the dollar values reported in Table 1 and Table 2 
will be proportionally lower. However, the schooling years are not affected by the total hours per year assumed in 
the model. 
   14of the observed gap. The average hourly wage rate at the predicted years of schooling is $13.38 
for blacks and $13.89 for whites. 
The predicted health expenditures from the model are $1,584 for blacks and $1,802 for 
whites. This suggests that white men spend about 20% more than black men in health 
expenditures. Given that the predicted schooling years are lower than the observed schooling 
years, it is not surprising that predicted health expenditures from the model are lower than the 
U.S. per capita health expenditure in 1990 ($2,167).  
Figure 1 illustrates the predicted lifetime trajectories of income, consumption, leisure and 
wealth. In Figure 1a where the consumption trajectories are shown, one interesting observation is 
the large drop in consumption level at the time of retirement. Based on equation (7), the marginal 
utility just before retirement should equal the marginal utility just after retirement. Since leisure 
and consumption are substitutable in the given utility function, an increase in leisure due to 
retirement is compensated by a lower consumption of goods. In Table 1, blacks spend an average 
$12,500 in consumption per year, while whites on average consume $13,471 per year. Whites 
consume 7.77% more than blacks. 
Figure 1b shows lifetime trajectories for net incomes, defined as the labor income minus 
the sum of health expenditures and the cost of schooling. At the working stage, blacks’ average 
labor income is $18,850, while whites’ average income is $20,059. Whites’ labor incomes are 
6.4% higher than blacks’ labor incomes. For the reason of simplicity, our model does not include 
returns of experience in the accumulation of human capital. In our setup, wages for both blacks 
and whites do not increase after they finish school.  
The wealth trajectories in Figure 1c show a familiar life cycle pattern: both the black 
agent and the white agent borrow to finance their education, save when they work, and dissave 
after they retire. The black agent’s wealth level is lower than the white agent’s during most of the 
life span. The only period when the black agent’s wealth exceeds the white agent’s wealth is the 
period immediately after schooling, since the black agent starts to work earlier than the white 
agent. The maximum wealth for both blacks and whites occurs at age 65 when they are about to 
retire. The maximum wealth level is $307.1K for blacks and $360.1K for whites. The lifetime 
mean wealth level is $97,890 for blacks and $116,970 for whites. White men have 19.5% more 
wealth than black men.  
   15In the trajectories of leisure in Figure 1d, schooling requires more studying hours (or less 
leisure) than working. During the second stage when people work, the labor supply of black men 
is slightly lower than the labor supply of white men, indicating that black men not only have less 
education, but they also work less. During the working stage, the labor supply for the black agent 
is 2,272 hours per year, while the labor supply for the white agent is 2,314 hours.  
  In summary, in this model, blacks and whites are the same except in the mortality risks of 
the reference group by which they are categorized. Therefore, all the differences in economic 
outcomes, including consumption, income, wealth and labor supply, are attributed to the 
differences in mortality risks from the reference groups. More than two-thirds of the black-white 
educational difference can be explained by their difference in mortality risk. 
    
C. Sensitivity Analysis 
In the previous subsection, we show that when parameters are given their baseline values, 
the predicted schooling difference is over two-thirds of the observed difference between black 
men and white men. In this subsection, we study if the baseline results hold beyond the particular 
set of parameter values.  
The sensitivity analysis is conducted according to the following procedure. We let one 
parameter vary at a time while holding other parameters constant at their baseline values. For any 
new set of parameter values, we re-optimize the whole life-cycle model to obtain optimal years 
of schooling for blacks and whites. For each parameter, we must determine a parameter interval 
in which we may conduct a sensitivity analysis. Selecting the parameter interval involves two 
steps. First, we search the boundary parameter value. When the parameter is beyond the 
boundary value, the additional years of schooling for blacks are negative (i.e. the total years of 
schooling are fewer than the minimum nine years of schooling assumed in the paper); or, no 
solution can be found. Second, we let the middle point of the interval be the baseline parameter 
value, and we let one end of the interval be the boundary parameter value we just selected in the 
first step. Obviously the interval is determined after one end point and the middle point of the 
interval are chosen. For example, for the time discount rate θ, the baseline parameter is θ =0.032. 
First, we find out that when θ>0.034, optimal years of schooling for blacks would be negative. 
Second, when we let θ =0.034 be the upper boundary of the parameter interval and let θ=0.032 
be the middle point, the lower boundary of the interval is then θ=0.030.  Thus, the interval to 
   16conduct sensitivity analysis for the time discount rate is [0.030, 0.034]. This interval is then 
divided into twenty equally spaced sub-intervals. There are twenty-one end points of these 
twenty sub-intervals. We let θ be each of these twenty-one end points. For each different θ, we 
obtain optimal schooling years and health expenditure. We obtain twenty-one sets of schooling 
years and health expenditures for both black men and white men, one of which is the baseline 
result.  
With these twenty-one sets of schooling years and health expenditures, we calculate the 
mean differences and their standard errors in schooling years and in health expenditures between 
black men and white men. This process repeats for other parameters: leisure in school l , cost of 
education parameter ξ, risk averse parameter σ, mortality production parameter β and µ and the 
interest rate r. The returns of education are calculated at nine years of schooling. From Equation 
(19), there are two parameters that determine the return of education. For simplicity, we only let 
the parameter φ in (19) change to obtain the parameter interval for the return of education. 
From Table 2, we see that the mean differences in years of schooling under various 
experiments are very similar. The observed black-white difference is 0.76 years. When we let the 
time discount rate θ vary between 0.030 and 0.034, the mean difference in years of schooling is 
0.59, which is a little higher than 2/3 of the observed difference. In fact, the mean differences 
range from 0.537 to 0.646 when all parameters except the interest rate vary in their parameter 
intervals. When the interest rate varies in its parameter interval, the mean difference in schooling 
years is 0.890, which is larger than the observed difference in schooling years. We conclude that 
the impact of mortality risk on schooling explains more than two-thirds of the empirical 
education difference in schooling years between black men and white men. 
The baseline parameter values for the mortality production function in (1) are β=0.445 
and µ=1.101. In Section IIIA, we show that the baseline values likely overestimate the actual 
parameter values. Here we discuss the outcomes of the model if either of the two parameters 
have lower values. We consider lowering the parameter µ. For example, if µ is lowered by 20%, 
i.e., µ=0.9, the schooling years are 13.10 for blacks and 13.62 for whites. The difference between 
blacks and whites remain the same as the baseline case. In fact, if we let ] 501 . 1 , 701 . 0 [ ∈ µ , the 
average difference in schooling years between blacks and whites is 0.565 with a standard 
deviation of 0.185. The difference in schooling years is quite robust to the value of µ. However, 
the schooling years is more sensitive to the parameter β. For example, if we lower β by 20% 
   17(other parameters are at their baseline values) i.e. β=0.356, the schooling years are 12.463 for 
whites and 12.077 for blacks. Although the difference in schooling years is reduced to 0.386 
years, it represents a significant portion (50%) of the observed difference in schooling years.   
In addition to the differences in schooling years, Table 2 also lists mean differences in 
health expenditures and their standard errors for all other parameters. For example, when the 
time discount rate varies in the interval [0.030, 0.034], the health expenditures for blacks vary 
from $826 (when θ =0.030) to $1,698 (when θ =.034). The whites’ health expenditure varies 
from $1274 (when θ=0.030) to $2,119 (when θ=0.034). The mean difference in health 
expenditures, when the time discount varies, is $556 with a standard error of $152. In fact, a 
different set of parameters produces a different set of health expenditures for both blacks and 
whites.  
Figure 2a – Figure 2h illustrate schooling years of blacks and whites when each of the 
parameters varies in its parameter interval. For example, Figure 2a draws schooling years when 
the time discount rate θ varies in its parameter interval, [0.030, 0.034], while other parameters 
are held at their baseline values. The schooling years for whites lie above the schooling years for 
blacks. Although the level change of schooling years is rather large, from 10.66 years to 13.86 
years for blacks and from 11.25 years to 14.62 years for whites, as the time discount rate 
increases from 0.030 to 0.034, the difference in years of schooling stays roughly the same. The 
standard error of the average difference in schooling years between whites and blacks is 0.038, 
only about 6% of its mean. Therefore, when the time discount rate varies in its parameter 
interval, the level of schooling years is no longer consistent with the observed years of schooling. 
However, the black-white difference in schooling years from our model is consistent with the 
observed difference.  
Similar patterns repeat for four other parameters: leisure in school (Figure 2b), mortality 
function parameter µ (Figure 2c), the return of education (Figure 2d) and the cost of education 
(Figure 2e).  When one of these four parameters varies in its respective parameter intervals, 
levels of schooling years vary greatly; however, the mean differences (with relatively small 
standard errors) in black-white schooling years match with the observed difference. Therefore, 
the result that the difference in mortality risks can explain much of the black-white difference in 
schooling years is robust for these four parameters.  
   18For the remaining two parameters, the risk averse parameter σ, the mortality production 
parameter β, and the interest rate r, schooling years for whites always lie above those for blacks, 
indicating that whites always complete more schooling years than blacks. In addition, the mean 
differences match with observed differences in schooling years when each of these parameters 
varies in its respective parameter intervals. However, these mean differences in schooling years 
have a larger variation. For the risk averse parameter σ, the difference in black-white schooling 
years varies from 0.115 (σ = 2.26) to 0.843 (σ = 1.74). The average difference is 0.537 years 
with a standard error of 0.203. For the mortality production parameter β, the difference in black-
white schooling years varies from 0.103 (β = 0.245) to 0.815 (β = 0.645); the average difference 
is 0.638 with a standard error of 0.253. Finally, when the interest varies from 0.026 to 0.054, the 
average difference is 0.890 with a standard error of 0.733. Since the mean differences in 
schooling years from our model are consistently around two-thirds of the observed difference in 
schooling years, we claim that the difference in schooling years for black and white men can be 
substantially explained by the mortality risks. However, such a claim is less robust for three out 
of the eight parameters discussed in the paper.  
Finally, from Figure 2a – Figure 2h, one can find out how choices in schooling years 
change when one of the parameters changes. Figures are rather intuitive. When the leisure in 
school is higher, staying in school becomes more appealing and years of schooling increase 
(Figure 2b). In Figure 2c, when the mortality production parameter varies, the marginal gain 
from health expenditures increases. Therefore, it is beneficial to have more education in order to 
afford better health expenditures. The similar reason applies to Figure 2g. A higher return of 
education raises years of schooling (Figure 2d), while a higher cost of education lowers years of 
schooling (Figure 2e).  In Figure 2h, a higher interest rate lowers years of schooling since it 
raises the opportunity cost of schooling. The intuition in other figures is only slightly more 
complicated. In Figure 2a, a higher discount rate lowers years of schooling since current utility is 
valued higher. In Figure 2f, a more risk averse person has lower years of schooling since he has a 
higher tendency to avoid risky investment of education.    
 
IV.  Conclusion 
Tremendous resources have been devoted to reduce the black-white gap. This paper 
investigates to what extent the difference in educational attainment between black and white men 
   19can be explained by the differences in their mortality risks. We develop a dynamic life-cycle 
model with optimal stopping-point in which group-level mortality risk plays an important role in 
determining individual-level health expenditure, mortality risk and amount of schooling. In the 
model, an agent’s mortality is a function of his own health expenditure and his reference group’s 
mortality risks. In such a framework, both the agent’s years of schooling and mortality risks are 
endogenous while the reference group’s mortality risks are exogenous.  
We let the black male population be the reference group for a representative black male 
and let the white male population be the reference group for a representative white male. The 
resulting years of schooling for black and white men are then compared with observed schooling 
for black and white men, respectively. 
  We calibrate the model by finding a set of baseline parameter values such that optimal 
schooling years match a large part of the observed years of schooling for both black men (12.74 
years) and white men (13.50 years). The optimal health expenditures are $1,584 per year for a 
black male and $1,802 per year for a white male. Blacks spend about 12% less in health 
expenditure than whites. We then conduct various sensitivity analyses by locally varying 
parameters. We find that although levels of schooling years are sensitive to various parameter 
values, the difference in schooling years between blacks and whites is relatively robust in various 
parameter values. We conclude that the mortality difference between blacks and whites is 







Altonji, Joseph G. and Rebecca M. Blank, 1999. “Race and gender in the labor market,” in O. 
Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3c, Elsevier 
Science B.V. (1999): 3144-3259. 
 
Backus, David K., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Finn E. Kydland, 1994. “Dynamics of the trade balance 
and the terms of trade: the J-curve?” American Economic Review (March 1994): 84-103. 
 
Bils, Mark and Peter Klenow, 2000. “Does schooling cause growth?” American Economic 
Review, 90(6) (December 2000): 1160-1183. 
 
   20Durlauf, Steven, 2002. “Groups, social influences and inequality: a membership theory 
perspective on poverty traps.” Working paper, Department of Economics, University 
Wisconsin. 
 
Ehrlich, Isaac and F.T. Lui, 1991. “Intergenerational trade, longevity, and economic growth.” 
American Economic Review, 99 (6) (October 1991): 1029-1059. 
 
Fernandez, Raquel and Richard Rogerson, 1996. “Income distribution, communities, and the 
quality of public education,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111: 135-164. 
 
Fries, James F., 1980. “Aging, natural death, and the compression of morbidity.” New England 
Journal of Medicine, 303(3): 130-36. 
 
Grossman, M. 1972a, “On the concept of health capital and the demand for health,” Journal of 
Political Economy 80: 223-255. 
 
Grossman, M. 1972b, The Demand for Health: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation 
(Columbia University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, New York).  
 
Grossman, Michael, 2000. “The human capital model of the demand for health,” in J. Newhouse 
and A. Culyer (eds), Handbook of Health Economics, Amsterdam: North Holland. 
 
Jones, Charles, 2002. “Why have health expenditures as a share of GDP risen so much?”. NBER 
Working Paper w9325. 
 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem, Harl E. Ryder, and David N. Weil, 2000. “Mortality decline, human 
capital investment, and economic growth,” Journal of Development Economics, 62 
(2000): 1-23. 
 
Kamien, M.I. and N.L. Schwartz, 1991. Dynamic Optimization: The Calculus of Variations and 
Optimal Control in Economics and Management, Second Edition, North-Holland: New 
York. 
 
Kenkel, Donald. S, 2000. “Prevention,” in J. Newhouse and A. Culyer (eds), Handbook of 
Health Economics, Amsterdam: North Holland. 
 
Livi-Bacci, M. 1997. A Concise History of World Population, Second edition, Oxford: 
Blackwell. Translated by Carl Ipsen. 
 
Massey, Douglas and Nancy Denton, 1989. “Hypersegregation in U.S. metropolitan areas: Black 
and Hispanic segregation along five dimensions.” Demography, 26 (August 1989): 371-
391. 
 
Manski, Charles, 1993. “Identification of endogenous social effects: the reflection problem.” 
Review of Economic Studies, 60 (3), pp. 531-42. 
 
   21Matthews, R.C.O., C. H. Feinstein, and J.C. Odling-Smee, 1982. British Economic Growth 
1856-1973, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
 
Maxwell, Nan, 1994. “The effect on black-white wage differences of differences in quantity and 
quality of education.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 47(2): 249-264. 
 
National Center for Health Statistics. U.S. decennial life tables for 1979-1981, 1(1). Hyattsville, 
Maryland. 1987. 
 
Neal, Derek A. and William R. Johnson, 1996. “The role of pre-market factors in black-white 
wage differences.” Journal of Political Economy, 104 (6): 869-895.  
 
O’Neill, June, 1990. “The role of human capital in earnings differences between black and white 
men.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 (Fall): 25-45.   
 
Preston, Samuel H., 1980. “Causes and consequences of mortality declines in less developed 
countries during the twentieth century,” in Richard S. Easterlin (ed), Population and 
economic change in developing countries. National Bureau of Economic Research 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980): 289-341.   
 
Preston, Samuel H., 1996. “Population studies of mortality.” Population Studies, 50(3), 
(November 1996): 525-536. 
 
Rosenzweig, Mark R. and T. Paul Schultz, 1983. “Estimating a household production function: 
heterogeneity, the demand for health inputs, and their effects on birth weight.” Journal of 
Political Economy, 91 (October), iss. 5, pp. 723-46. 
 
Roux, Ana V. D., Sharon Stein Merkin, Donna Arnett, Lloyd Chambless, Mark Massing, Javier 
Nieto, Paul Sorlie, Moyses Szklo, Herman A. Tyroler and Robert L. Watson, 2001. 
“Neighborhood of residence and incidence of coronary heart disease.” The New England 
Journal of Medicine, 345 (2): 99-106. 
 
Sen A.K., 1999, Development as freedom. New York: Knopf.  
 
Soares, Rodrigo Resis, 2002. “Life expectancy, education attainment, and fertility choice.” 
Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland. 
 
Winkleby, M.A. and C. Cubbin, 2003, “Influence of individual and neighbourhood 
socioeconomic status on mortality among black, Mexican-American, and white women 
and men in the United States.” Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 57 (June).    
 
Winship, Christopher, and Sanders Korenman, 1997. “Does staying in school make you 
smarter?” in Intelligence, Genes, and Success, Devlin, et al. (eds), Spring-Verlag. 
 
Yarri, M., 1965. “Uncertain lifetime, life insurance and the theory of the consumer.” Review of 
Economic Studies, 32: 137 - 150. 
   22Table 1: Baseline Parameter Values and Results 
 
Parameter description and notation  Values 
  Mortality production function:    
 parameter  β 0.445 
 parameter  µ 1.101 
 Utility  function:     
 relative  risk  averse  σ 2.0 
 share  of  consumption  α .33 
  Human capital function:   
 parameter  φ 0.58 
 parameter  η 0.32 
  Opportunity cost of education ξ  .5 
  Leisure at school l   0.40 
  Time discount rate θ 0.032 
 Interest  rate  r 0.04 
  Wage rate per unit of human capital w 1.47 
Outcomes of the model  Blacks  Whites 
  Years of schooling  12.60  13.12 
  (Observed years of schooling)  (12.74)  (13.50) 
  Health expenditure (in $1,000)  1.584  1.802 
  Average lifetime wealth (in $1,000)  100.9  120.1 
  Average lifetime consumption (in $1,000)  12.500  13.471 
  Average labor income when working (in $1,000)  18.850  20.059 
  Average labor supply when working (in hours)  2,272  2,314 
  Average hourly wage rate (in $)  13.38  13.89 
 
 
Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
  Parameter values  Outcome of the model 
 












Time discount rate θ 0.032  [0.030,  0.034]  0.590  $565 
     (0.038)  ($152) 
Leisure at school l   .40 [0.386,0.414] 0.610  $589 
     (0.081)  ($44) 
Mortality production parameter µ 1.101  [0.701,  1.501]  0.565  $609 
     (0.185)  ($300) 
Return of education at 9 years of schooling  0.0913  [0.0888, 0.0938]  0.640  $588 
     (0.034)  ($177) 
Opportunity cost of education ξ 0.50  [0.47,  0.53]  0.646  $589 
     (0.0217)  ($140) 
Relative risk averse parameter σ  2.0 [1.74,  2.26] 0.537  $612 
     (0.203)  ($358) 
Mortality production parameter β 0.445  [0.245,  0.645]  0.638  $653 
     (0.253)  ($451) 
Interest rate r 0.04  [0.026,  0.054]  0.890  $624 
     (0.733)  ($567) 




Figure 1b: Lifetime Net Income Trajectories 
 
 
   24 
Figure 1c: Lifetime Wealth Trajectories 
 
 




   25Figure 2: Schooling Years as One of the Parameters Varies 
   
     Figure 2a: When time discount rate varies             Figure 2b: When leisure in school varies 
 
  Figure 2c: When mortality production parameter µ varies     Figure 2d: When return to education varies 
   
 
Figure 2e: When cost of education varies          Figure 2f: When risk averse parameter varies 
    
 
      Figure 2g: When mortality production parameter β varies       Figure 2h: When interest rate varies 
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